Already facing a $4 billion underfunding of two of the state’s pension plans, the legislature is going to learn it’s short another $5 billion in health care promises it’s made to future state employee retirees. Taken together, the state has $9 billion in unfunded liabilities.
Will this be a sneaker wave crashing down on this state’s liberal constituencies who want their Democrat-controlled legislature to spend more money on their pet programs? Or, will, once again, Frank Chopp find another accounting gimmick to shove the bill onto future legislatures?
The legislature is already dealing with the $4 billion problem with the pension plans by amortizing the debt until the year 2024. But, the additional $5 billion liability is new on the horizon since accounting rules have only made government account for future cash flow requirements to fund pensions and not for the other retirement benefit promises, i.e., health care.
But that’s changing next fiscal year.
Precipitated by the financial collapse of the City of San Diego a few years ago, a new accounting rule known as GASB 45 (pronounced GASBEE) for the Governmental Accounting Standards Board that issued it in 2004, will take effect in July, 2007. When it does, observers believe that the problem will amount to $1.7 trillion for all levels of government in America. This will be a shock to Americans who already face a staggering Social Secuity funding issue for retiring baby boomers.
GASB 45 requires government to account for the unfunded liabilities for retirement benefits other than pensions, namely healthcare, insurance and disability benefits. Under old accounting rules these expenses were most likely accounted for during the years of actual retirement. Now government must account for the cost of the future benefit during the working years of the employee, or about 1/30th the cost of estimated retirement benefits each year an employee works.
But GASB 45 only requires governments to expense for these future liabilities, but not to fund them.
Huh? Funding is the actual allocation of real dollars to an account (also known as cash flow); Expensing simply accounts for the liability on income statements.
So, if the government delays funding, what’s the big deal? The impact will come from honest accounting records detailing indebtedness. That in turn will bespeak of the quality of fiscal policy which impacts bond ratings, in other words, the cost of credit and the ability of the state to borrow money.
And, if the state had no plan to rectify the unfunded liablities, future taxpayers would face huge bills to pay for the pensions and healthcare benefits already earned by our current state employees.
Since the GASB 45 rule change was announced, the Washington Office of the State Actuary has had a committee studying the healthcare unfunded liability. It’s not an easy task since health care insurance costs have been volatile. How does one model these costs 10, 15 or even 20 years out? The committee’s report is not due for another month and no numbers are final. But the number heard around the hallways is $5 billion, give or take.
My prediction is that Frank Chopp will engineer another accounting trick, as he did with paying for the pension plan underfunding (see below). Doing this will allow him to keep cash in next year’s budget so he can reward his constituencies by pushing retirement indebtedness onto future taxpayers.
Background: Unfunded Pension Liabilies
The Washington State Department of Retirement Systems (DRS) manages eight retirement systems, serving more than 436,000 current and former government employees. The three largest are the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS), the Teachers Retirement System (TRS), and the School Employees’ Retirement System (SERS). The Department of Retirement Systems also administers plans for the Law Enforcement Officers’ and Fire Fighters Retirement System (LEOFF), the Washington State Patrol Retirement System (WSPRS), the Judges’ Retirement Fund (JRF), and the Judicial Retirement System (JRS), as well as the Deferred Compensation and Dependent Care Assistance programs.
Although two of the retirement plans are underfunded by $4 billion, “Washington State is not in crisis,” explains David Pringle of the State Actuary Office. He explains that all eight plans taken collectively are more than 100 percent funded. That’s because several other plans are overfunded.
Eight years ago, during the booming stock market days, all the state’s retirement plans were in great shape. But then two things happened: First the Democrat-controlled legislature, over the objection of the Republicans, approved “Gain Sharing” for already retired PERS1 and TRS1 employees. The concept was to share some of the great return on state pension assets from the booming stock market with the retirees, you know, the old-grey-haired-former-school-teachers-on-a-fixed-income. The problem with this liberal policy was that it did not forsee the possiblity of a downturned stock market. Since gain-sharing increased the base pay of already retired employees it accrued an unfunded liability in event of a bad stock market. And, the bad stock market was the second thing to trigger a small collapse in the state’s pension assets.
The 2003 Actuarial Valuation Report (AVR) found that gain-sharing adds an estimated $622 million to the present value of the fully projected benefits liability in Plans 2/3 and the unfunded liability of Plan 1 by $930 million.
If left intact, gain-sharing will cost an additional $7.8 billion over the next 25 years.
Even the Democrats are waking up to their fiscal blunder. There is a good chance Frank Chopp will engineer a repeal of gain sharing this year.
So, how has Chopp dealt with the $4 billion unfunded liability issue in the last three legislatures?
In order to balance the last few budgets and still increase spending on pet programs, Washington’s legislature has had an accounting trick to pay for the unfunded pension liability. The trick resembles a mortgage stretched out until the year 2024. By paying interest only on this debt for the next few years, the last legislature got away with a payment of less than $100 million. According to a model (see page 36) presented to the Select Committee on Pension Policy this fall, the first principal payment won’t occur until 2010. Payments will gradually reach $900 million by 2024. And, remember, these payments will be made by future taxpayers for debts accrued by Frank Chopp’s past few legislatures.
As liberal as this policy is, Frank Chopp did get a lucky break the last six months. The stock market boomed. And, if the stock market keeps performing well, the pension plan underfunding liability could possibly evaporate. Last year, the state received 15% on all its managed pension monies and its assets grew from $60 billion to $70 billion. A few more years like that and it would be good news indeed since the current model assumes only an eight % return on managed assets. But that’s gambling on the stock market.
If Chopp lucks out with the stock market in the pension fund, he can never have any such luck on the $5 billion unfunded health care liability. The difference is that unlike the pension fund, with $70 billion earning (hopefully big) market returns, the health care fund has zero assets invested. Chopp has to come up with a real $5 billion to pay for health care.
Despite the pension plan problems, Washington State is faring better than most states. Oklahoma, for instance, is facing the staggering problem that its teacher’s pension plan is only 35 percent funded.
In the private sector, the rising cost of retirement has led employers to reduce benefits. But public employers have been reluctant to follow suit. The Democrats are beholden to public employee labor unions.
Ultimately, it’s not government that will be held accountable, it’s taxpayers — be it through higher taxes, reduced services, or a combination of both.
Above all the solution to the problem must be full financing. The bill for all governmental pension promises must be paid as they are made, just as prudent private companies do. Otherwise, the younger generation is left to pay for the contract.
